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I. INTRODUCTION
The Jessup Competition has awakened perspectives about decision
making in the students of international law. It has served in the legal
education of countless students, and it has even served the promotion and
perhaps the development of international law itself., In pursuit of its
objectives, the Jessup has grown to command major worldwide attention
and substantial prestige due to its inclusion of contestants originating from
all parts of the globe. The inclusion of these worldwide contestants is
enough evidence to show that the Jessup Competition has caught the
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General Counsel, Department of Defense. B.S. Yale; B.Ch.E. Cornell; J.D. Harvard Law School;
LL.M. and Ph.D., with distinction in international law, London School of Economics, London;
Member, New York Bar; Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States; Barrister at Law, of Gray's
Inn, London. I extend my appreciation and thanks to the student editors of this article, Lorenzo
Level and Orville McKenzie.
1. Legal education was afforded a major impetus in the writings of Myres McDougal and
his associates. See, e.g., Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) [hereinafter Legal
Education]; Florentino Feliciano, Book Review, in MYRES McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES
IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1024 n.8 (1960); MYRES McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (New Haven Press 1994) (1967)
[hereinafter INTERPRETATION). See generally MYRES MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960) [hereinafter STUDIES].
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imagination of law schools throughout the world.2  With the aid of
television, video cassette recordings, and the publication of Jessup
materials, the competition could expand its reach even further.,
Even given these past accomplishments and the present
praiseworthy state of the Jessup, it is not inopportune to make a reappraisal
at this time to determine whether we can strengthen the Jessup. In making
this appraisal, we can draw upon the experience of other devices operating
in reasonably similar contexts or situations to aid us.'
One device available to us is the art of gaming. Specifically, war
gaming offers us great potentialities: it can be conceived primarily as a
means for assembling and collecting information, data and intelligence in
groupings suitable or relevant to a given inquiry; for identifying outcomes
or potential outcomes; for working with problems that have a need for
urgent action; for promoting data access or retrieval; and for building a
data bank or even tapping other data banks. War gaming makes us data
conscious as no other technique does.
Of course, there are differing perspectives about the conceptual
element in making war. We look to this exercise as an art, while the
Soviet Union in their war gaming were said to consider it a science with
applicable principles, but including the application of complex
technological advancements and features such as those evidenced by
nuclear weapons and the high technology jet aircraft.'
Similar to the differing perspectives of the United States and the
Soviet Union about the concept of war gaming itself, war gaming and moot
court participants differ in their approaches to their respective games. War
gaming participants are eager to refine the power element in their games
2. The leading article on this subject expressed in comprehensive sweep, and in detailed
terms, is Legal Education, supra note 1.
3. Numerous other applications for more effective and powerful uses of simulation are
now beginning to appear. The Internet, for example, holds the promise of a wider audience, and
wider participation in the Jessup, and the impact of an increased amount of scholarly assessment
of the competition itself. Much will depend upon introducing the Jessup itself onto the Internet.
4. Various devices have been formulated for simulation of the symbolic framework of
reference and the real world decisions and actions. See generally A. H. HAUSRATH, VENTURE
SIMULATION IN WAR, BUSINESS, AND POLITICS (McGraw-Hill 1962). Hausrath says that war
games differ in many ways, but he lists the salient similarities to be found. Id. at 82-97. These
strongly suggest analogies and similarities to those found in the moot court competitions:
Every war game simulates a military operation (irrespective of phase or manner of
gaming); each game involves to or more opposing forces; each war game is conducted
in accordance with data, rules, and procedures acceptable to the military profession;
every war game represents an actual or assumed real-life situation.
Id. at 82.
5. See THOMAS ALLEN WAR GAMES 59-62 (McGraw-Hill 1987).
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whereas those engaged in Jessup Moot Courts tend to keep the rules of the
moot court game intact and unchanged. The attitude of the moot court
participants runs parallel with the prominent attitude about our courts and
their proceedings, but it interferes with the development of refinements,
which have only recently and slowly come into view in the interest in
alternative dispute settlement procedures. Borrowing from this recent
refinement, if encouraged by the adoption of gaming, the Jessup might
consider the possibility of alternative settlement devices tested in a
simulation framework.
Another interesting possibility that may be encouraged by gaming
is the intrusion or intervention of law as an element in the decisions to be
made when states are interacting with eachother in a global, even if
competitive, arena. Introduction of law as an element in the decision
process amounts to an introduction of a theory or concept of public legal
order, ambiguous to a large extent in this period of largely unorganized
organs for a global community.6  It also introduces the legal processes
applicable under this legal order, and the outcomes expected in introducing
law into the decision process. This possibility can be explored, through
the application of law in gaming, i.e., in the war games, or other conflict-
oriented games.,
But instead of limiting the discussion to war games, this paper will
look at war gaming on a conceptual level to determine whether the Jessup
might benefit from the experience that has accumulated through the use of
war gaming. My primary objective is clarification of the Jessup as an
instrument involving policy problems. I intend to consider standards that
might be applied to add useful modifications to the Jessup. 8  I have
6. See generally 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984). This volume is a recommended
collection of academic approaches to problems of international law, introducing the use of the
incident as a decisional unit in international law, both the theoretical and operational dimensions.
The chapter on the claims in Canada relating to accident of Cosmos 954 is useful for illustrating
this approach, and for providing a future Jessup problem. Id. at 78. For a scientific counterpart
to public order in the communities or states, i.e., the conception of nature and the physical world
in terms of a scientific order, see generally ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE
MODERN WORLD (Cambridge Univ. Press 1926).
7. See ALLEN, supra note 5.
8. The Jessup practice might be appraised at this time as well: would it be advisable, for
example, to limit the appearances of judges in a given competition, particularly if it is likely that
they will appear at various stages in the competition and find the same adversaries before them?
Or would it be desirable to permit a one or two time modification and refinement of the Jessup
memorials during the competition itself to incorporate the growing sophistication of the
contestants? (This presupposes the use of a word processor). Or what steps should be taken to
prepare the judges, or to make the scheduling of the Jessup closer to the real time needs of the
law schools? Should the Jessup memorials be published and more widely circulated by the
American Society of International Law, or the finals televised, and the television rights extended
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refrained from assessing the housekeeping or even major repair efforts for
running the Jessup at this time. Consequently, this inquiry is limited to the
possible cross-fertilization of gaming and moot court procedures.
II. STRENGTHENING THE JESSUP COMPETITION
A. The Jessup As an Instrument for Learning and Promoting Policy
What are the objectives of the Jessup Competition? Foremost
among the Jessup's objectives is to facilitate the learning experience for the
contestants, and, to a comparable extent, for the judges, faculty advisors
and others who participate.' But what does this learning experience entail?
Moreover, what learning experiences can be added to the presents ones,
partly as an effort to promote policy?
1. Present Learning Experiences
The Jessup offers a valuable instrument for improving the general
lawyer skills of the contestants, coupled with improvements in the
analytical skills of the observers of the moot court cases.'0 The Jessup also
provides a forum of deliberation and discourse for probing current
problems in law, especially when presented in the context of a legal
dispute. As such it enables those who participate or analyze the Jessup
cases an opportunity to see the perspectives of numerous participants at
play upon such problems, paralleling one of the ways in which the student
is introduced to practice in the law schools. It extends a student's effort
beyond the review of cases and appellate review into a complex, real-world
simulation where the performance is judged by the effective invoking and
appraisal of law, and the innovative effort in making law serve us, rather
to the public broadcast stations? These more sophisticated developments might be considered if
we move the Jessup closer to an instrument for probing or refining the practices of the real world
of the International Court of Justice, or other international tribunals.
9. The leading article on this subject expressed in comprehensive sweep, and in detailed
terms, is Legal Education, supra note 1.
10. Cf. ALLEN, supra note 5. Definitions are not essential in the development of
wargaming. We are concerned with a dynamic medium, a simulation of decision making with
respect to actions to be taken, pursuant to standards and conditions, inferences and assumptions,
law and standards of reasonableness. The primary outcome desired is that of command and
control over information essential at all levels of human experience: information, data and
intelligence for inputs; data banks and data sources readily accessible for data availability and
evaluation; data relevance, economy of data preservation, analysis of impact on goals; data
access or retrievability, with regard to what is time urgent, action urgent, action impact.
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than having us serve the law and the rigidities we might arbitrarily impose
upon it.II
In essence, the Jessup is a collegial effort, where reinforcement
and testing of learning arises from the interaction of the participants. Our
experience so far shows that this interaction has been strongly motivated
among them. Because the problems presented by the Jessup are problems
of global significance, the problems add to that motivation the element of
exhilaration. At least a major refinement of the competition would be one
which facilitates greater and deeper participation. This refinement would
be sharpened if we could apply the Jessup as an instrument to refine our
critical faculties.
Because the development of international law is in part an outcome
of attitudes and perspectives, the Jessup offers opportunities for practicing
lawyers, acting as judges, to gain working skills in a subject of major
importance. As in the war gaming exercises, there is also the possibility of
changing the format of the Jessup, adding to the overall, adjudicatory
setting of the Jessup a panel for the meetings of the American Society of
International Law that takes the output of the Jessup competition and then
provides comments and opinion.'
11. The Jessup may contribute to the shaping of law through its impact upon attitudes,
skills, enlightenment, and so on. How far that impact will reach is unclear, but in ALAN
WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 33 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985), it is observed that:
"[law develops by lawyers thinking about the normative facts, whether in the abstract or in
relation to hypothetical or actual societal facts. A course becomes set which is difficult to alter."
Lawyers, he argues:
come to treat law as fact - normative fact, of course, but still something existing in its
own right. Faced with a legal problem, lawyers contemplate the societal facts of the
issue and the normative facts of the law that have to be applied to them to come up
with the answer. The societal facts and the normative facts may be equally hard to
discover.
Id. at 32, 33.
12. This proposal is preliminary; it presupposes that if the American Society of
International Law were to provide for such a panel commenting on and even critiquing the
Jessup, as well as mining it for its effectiveness and content, it would be necessary to have the
Jessup final early in the annual meetings rather than at the last day. The panel then convened
would be an ad hoc panel, but this drawback can be overcome if experienced panellists are
chosen, it would offer a chance to add a refining procedure to the Jessup and to strengthening its
policy content. A frame of reference, familiar to international lawyers, is that of HAROLD
LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (Yale Univ. Press 1950) [hereinafter
POWER]. These terms of reference relate to unraveling the ambiguities and uncertainties in the
decision and policy making activities of individuals, enterprise and governments. The approach
is that of the problematic, and aimed at future courses of action: "From the manipulative
standpoint, the problematic situation with which inquiry begins is resolved into alternative goals
possible in the situation, and the problem is formulated in terms of courses of action leading to
the goal." Id. at xi.
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2. Possibilities for the Future
Carefully designed Jessup problems can introduce social order
perspectives critical to the evolution of international law intended to serve
global public order.'" Hence the Jessup can serve other law and policy
oriented objectives.14 It can provide a valuable instrument for probing real
world disputes, the policies and competing claims entailed, and their
ramifications. Even real world courts do this: they consider various
situations that have not come before them, and they provide dicta to reach
situations or issues not before the Court.'" Their dissents reveal differences
in attitudes and perspectives among the judges, and so on. 6  Hence the
Jessup offers us an instrument to probe important, but oft-treated marginal,
issues that every international court must face such as whether a dispute
offers a legal issue or, instead, is too political or too involved in
The systemic standpoint, or the overall logic of the method is a separate point of departure -
referred to as the contemplative standpoint. The key point in the value system adopted is that of
power: "political science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of
power." Id. at xiv. The dynamic features are characterized by perceptions that show change,
'patterns of succession of events," rather that fixed equilibria. The overall frame of reference is
readily adopted in the Jessup because both it and the framework of power and society speak to
the realities of human action and decision. Hence, decision making is forward looking,
formulating alternative courses of action extending into the future, and selecting among the
alternatives by expectations of how things will turn out. Id. at xv-xvi.
13. See generally Legal Education, supra note 1 (discussing the interaction of social policy
and law in the context of practicing international law).
14. See POWER, supra note 12, for a frame of reference familiar to international lawyers.
This frame relates to unraveling the decision and policy making activities of individuals,
enterprise and governments. The approach is aimed at the decision process in the context of
problems, and the overall goal is aimed at future courses of action.
15. The latest opinion of the International Court of Justice, an advisory opinion, relating to
the permissibility under international law of states possessing, or using, nuclear weapons includes
declarations of a number of the judges. This device enables the judge to step aside from handing
down a concurring or dissenting opinion, or, presumably from refraining from giving any
opinion at all, though this is controversial. It enables such judges to speak to all or any occasion,
for any purpose, simply because the declaration is that judge's perspective or comment on the
case even while he is refraining from any further participation in the case. See The Nuclear
Weapons Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. The larger problem of the declaration might be explored along
with advisory opinions by future Jessup competitions. See, infra, discussion on advisory
opinions in this paper.
16. See LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 7 (Harvard Univ. Press
1933). Though his inquiry primarily assesses the role of the courts in foreign policy, Jaffe's
remarks bring up the general problem of making decisions and policy in foreign affairs:
[tihe courts must move about in the spacious and dangerous realms of policy and
statesmanship; they are called upon to make a choice from among conflicting attitudes.
Such a choice will not only answer implicitly the given problem, but will also
transcend the results in individual case. Unless, then, a writer admits that below the
reasoned surfaces there is a question of attitudes, his objective legalism will rest on a
quicksand of subterranean compulsions.
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regulatory, administrative or discretionary matters for an international
court to tackle, let alone monitor or supervise."
The Jessup problem is a problem that should be designed so that it
can address a situation or events that have already been presented before a
court. Or, the Jessup can look at an array of real world problems and
situations to consider issues that might never be raised in the immediate
term of a court. Or it can look into a hypothetical problem working with
real world premises and assumptions. Or, we can even consider for the
Jessup a problem that is sub judice in international courts or tribunals.'8
All of these matters will eventually flow into the broader streams that make
up the great collegial effort that is part of the conscious shaping of
international law, its concepts, and its decision-making impacts. But to
achieve this expanded perspective for the Jessup we must adopt as its goals
wider missions, such as those mentioned here.
The Jessup is also a valuable and refined instrument of learning
and argument that can be used by others such as courts, schools,
advocates, working in or concerned with analogous cases. It offers a rare
opportunity to undertake with great care and in great depth an appraisal of
disputes and the applicable normative rules or principles. Clearly, the
effectiveness of the Jessup Competition depends upon the participants, but
in the hands of outstanding practitioners the Jessup and its contestants can
reach outcomes that match the efforts of experienced jurists. The Jessup
17. The notion of the political question and the practice of international courts to deny
adjudication of such questions is pervasive in the legal disputes brought before international
courts. However, the distinctions made between legal issues and political issues are not precise.
United States Supreme Court practice should be consulted. Jaffe considered this problem in the
context of the domestic courts of the United States, and in the context of a Constitution calling
for a separation of powers, but not laying down standards that determine precisely when and how
those powers are to be separated. The interaction and complexity of making this cut between the
authority of the executive and legislative branch is such that the Court, as Jaffe points out, has
frequently abdicated decision and left it a political question to be worked out by the other two
branches. With italics of his own, Jaffe cites Quincy Wright, and his observations that we can
make our distinction between the practice of the courts - constitutional understandings - and
the law of the Constitution, to wit:
The constitutional understandings are based on the distinction between the possession
of a power and discretion in the exercise of that power. The law of the constitution
decides what organs of the government possess the power to perform acts of
international significance [inter alia], but the understandings of the constitution decide
how the discretion or judgment, implied from the possession of power, ought to be
exercised in given circumstances.
Id. at 10.
18. In a sense a matter that is sub judice in the international tribunals simply is converted
into a hypothetical problem because the Jessup designers will not have what the court or tribunal
itself has by way of facts. Additionally, because the approaches of a real world court and a
Jessup differ the case will have the hypothetical element imparted by these factors.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
does include among the judges, especially in the final round, distinguished
jurists from the International Court of Justice and other high tribunals.
And perhaps more than the ICJ, the Jessup has the added competence to
question and probe issues from many points of view. The repetition of the
moot court trials upward through the Jessup competition tends to add
further refinements. To facilitate these refinements, the Jessup might
include a rule enabling contestants to modify their memorials several times
as they move forward.
The Jessup also provides us with a teaching tool. In praise of this
teaching aspect, the losing contestants have indicated that they benefited
from this feature even though they also saw the contest as one to be won.
Taking advantage of the Jessup is a teaching text about the law of war,
which makes use of a modified version of the Jessup. The text is open-
ended because a given problem in factual terms will always face changing
law, or changing attitudes about law. Thus, an instructor using a Jessup
oriented text is in the position to use an appropriately designed text over a
period of years, adding or eliminating situations or facts, and adding
supplementary materials of the instructor's own law or, for teaching
purposes, even facts that had not been included in the earlier versions.' 9
We can envision that this use of the Jessup might expand in the future
because the instrument it provides demands wide participation by the class
and instructor.
In this text the student learns from a form of practice. Through a
simulated unraveling of a problem dealing with a complex subject, the
student becomes familiar with the law of war and the law relating to the
use of force. The Jessup format is being used except that the facts are not
presented all at once, but in a sequential and simulated real time basis as
the conflict proceeds, uncovering a wide variety of legal issues to be
considered. This approach has some similarities to the briefings of high
ranking military officers at the Department of Defense in the various
exercises involving contingency operations, where the officers are briefed
in a real time combat situation, and then enabled in the game that follows
to engage in a simulation of a wartime situation.
19. I am suggesting here that this text might be able, appropriately designed, to remain as
the primary problem theme. If for example the Geneva Protocols of 1977 .(Publication of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Bern, 1977) had appeared after the text was in print, a
supplemental text could readily be added incorporating the impact of those Protocols, and the
documentary supplement could include the Protocols. Additional protocols have been concluded
concerning weapons of mass destruction, land mines and so on. In other contexts, such as the
games and briefings that make up the teaching techniques of a military staff there is now a wide
body of experience concerning the use of briefings and simulated actions taking place under
conditions very similar to those of an emergency or crisis.
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Although beyond the scope this paper, we might raise a further
problem to be probed through Jessups in the future. The Jessup approach
might enable us to consider more deeply on a collegial basis the decision
and law-making processes and activities of governments. Because
disputes, disagreements and misunderstandings are natural features of
human interaction, we need to know continuously how far we can invoke a
court in such matters. It is evident that most of the law-making process,
especially those that involve trans-national activities, occurs outside the
courts, and much of this process involves dispute settlement and the
accumulation of a wide variety of dispute settlement mechanisms. 0 The
Jessup, modified in approach, might enable us to probe the new institutions
and practices accumulated.
The Jessup offers the opportunity, not yet explored, of tackling
legal questions where advisory or commentary opinions are demanded.
The traditional dispute format of the Jessup, following fairly closely the
practice of the International Court of Justice, involves two states with a
dispute that can be resolved under law, pursuant to Articles 36 and 38 of
the ICJ statute. Under this authority, the court is to resolve legal disputes
by applying the applicable or relevant law. But for an advisory opinion,
legal questions about law are raised before the ICJ by way of a request
from an appropriate organ of the United Nations.2 1  Because the Jessup
format does not precisely follow the ICJ, it would be possible, in the
Jessup context, to consider requests by almost anyone for advisory
recommendations concerning the implications of any legal question or
prospective courses of action. In short, the Jessup offers flexibility that is
20. See John Jackson, Dispute Settlement Techniques Between Nations Concerning
Economic Relations - With Special Emphasis on Gatt, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (T. Carbonneau ed., Univ Press of Virginia 1990).
This article, as well as the book in general, provides a valuable insight into the growing
competence for resolving disputes in the course of the decisions and the processes of claim.
Although I will not discuss them all, in a broad sense there a large number of GATT dispute
settlement procedures. In fact, one can identify over thirty such procedures. For example, there
are nineteen clauses that obligate the parties of GATT to consult with each other in specific
instances. Each of these might be termed a dispute settlement procedure. Likewise, there are
seven different provisions for what the GATT calls "compensatory withdrawal or suspension of
concessions." Id. These allow one party to withdraw concessions from, or alter its trade
relationships with, another party in the face of certain types of actions by that other party.
It is evident that an important procedure in dispute settlement is one aimed to achieve
accommodation of differences among the parties, and that a further goal is to ensure effectiveness
and enforceability of the procedures adopted in the GAIT context, by giving parties the authority
to impose sanctions on others who carry out "certain types of actions" not permissible under the
GATT. THOMAS E. CARBONEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE
LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS (Univ. of IIl Press 1989).
21. See the U.N. CHARTER, art. 96; I.C.J. Statute. art. 65-68.
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not available in the real world of the ICJ, but in return for foregoing real
world decisions in a real world context, we are given the opportunity of
testing such decisions where we can enjoy the luxury of trial and error.
Clearly, these are matters that require further review.
Accordingly, if in the future we were to develop a Jessup
competition to work with legal questions while following the practice of
the ICJ, we would be looking to the interesting yet complex problem of
working out an approach for future contests that would employ the
advisory opinion. This would open the Jessup to a number of important
possibilities in testing the contestants-and in testing the ICJ as an institution
to promote customary international law through its own actions in the
formulation or prescription process.Y We would also be coming face to
face with the matter of formulating international law through the court and
the practices established or institutionalized to ensure that even though
recommendatory, the advisory opinions would be expected to be
assimilated as part of the customary international law. This format, both
for the Jessup and for a more active ICJ involved in advisory opinions,
would require that the judges, and perhaps a staff to assist the judges, have
a more active role in the intended output.Y At the same time, while the
22. Professor M. Reisman observes as to prescription that we are looking at a function of
decision, pointing out:
[p]rescription or law-making.. .occurs when actors, with varying degrees of authority,
select and install certain preferences about policy as community law. This may be
accomplished by a legislature or some other organized law-maker; but it is usually,
and, especially in international law, largely accomplished in informal and sometimes
even chaotic processes whose outcomes are generally refererred to as 'custom.'
Michael Reisman, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the Political Superior, 23 N. KY. L.
REV. 605, 612 (1996).
Because decisions are effective when enforceable, the other functions of decision [six are
mentioned by Reisman] can be separately assessed for the law-making impact when they are
used. Law-making is a component of enforcement shaping new law or applying the existing law.
Id. Articles in depth relating to this approach are cited by Reisman in his footnotes.
23. This paper does not recommend the abandonment of the Jessup format, but is intended
to critique the format, seek other probing devices such as that proposed in coupling the gaming
and moot court approaches, and test such things as the declaration and codification of customary
international law under the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. Law
especially as practiced among states or nations can be conceived as a policy instrument, a support
to policy, a support to the creation of public order, or the management of undesirable activities
such as aggression. In any event the advisory opinion has not been exploited either in the Jessup
or in the real world by the International Court of Justice and the contestants have so far not
exploited the opportunity to appraise the Court and its limitations in developing customary
international law by way of advisory opinions. A comparison of the law-making activities and
reciprocating support of such activities in the legislative sense of the Court under its advisory
competence and the legislative thrust in the formulations or prescriptions of treaty law has had an
ample assessment in the literature.
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opinion is the opinion of judges, the advisory opinion would take on a
legislative or prescriptive characterY
But this is not the place to critique the use of the advisory opinion,
in the real world, or in the Jessup. At the present time in the Jessups no
written opinion is handed down, and it is not proposed at this time that one
should be prepared in the Jessup contest. But such a proposal for the court
and its work in the real world is another matter. Opinions are provided,
complete with dissents, under conditions and under assessment procedures,
differing from those in which states come together to make law through
their treaties. But if we were to have the Jessup court pass on legal
questions, we would need to be assured that the legal question is
appropriately framed; that the differing perspectives of the advocates as to
the legal question be introduced to the court; and that the court be called
upon to issue its opinion.
Although a legal question may be the starting point for a variety of
responses, including those that may be contrary to each other, we might
arbitrarily break the problem involving advisory competence of the Jessup
Court into two sides, each presenting an opposing view as to the response
sought for the legal question. This format would be close to the war
gaming approach where an analysis and a report are made at the close of
the game.
If the Jessup court were given the competence to issue advisory
opinions for a future Jessup Competition, the report of the Jessup judges,
or even of a separately constituted panel of overseers and reporters, might
be simplified. Under this approach, the Jessup judges would consider and
pass upon the positions and arguments presented by the contestants, the
differing strengths of these, and the conclusion of the Court, operating as a
panel.
Of course, in the Jessup context, there is another possibility for the
Jessup court to review requests for an advisory opinion that is somewhat
less ambitious. The legal question for an advisory opinion could be
presented in the Jessup context by two sides, guided by the Jessup
24. It will be recalled that the judges of the United States Supreme Court, at an early
stage, advised that under the Constitution advisory opinions would not be advisable. The judges
pointed out that the Court was designed to adjudicate "cases or controversies" pursuant to Article
III Section 2. The cases involving the 'legislative courts," their distinctions and wider
jurisdiction have been widely analyzed. Advisory opinions are recognized in the adjudicatory
practice in other countries. For a general assessment see HENRY MELVIN HART & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Foundation Press 1953).
25. The alternative would envision a panel of judges and a panel of reporters working
together: it is probably too difficult for the Jessup judges to act as their own reporters and to
expect them competently to handle the judging.
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guidelines to advocate differing or opposing points of view concerning the
legal question, and acting in place of the larger number of participants in
the real world of the ICJ. The Jessup Court could then consider the
opposing positions, and come down on the position that was best
presented. It might be required to provide a very brief statement
supporting its determination and no more.
The first approach might provide a more valuable output both for
the academic and the practicing community of lawyers and jurists, but the
second might be more appropriate for the decisions that are to be taken by
an ad hoc group of judges operating in the traditional form of the Jessup.
It should be borne in mind, however, that even with the traditional Jessup
competitions, the court provides only its views as to the persuasive or
argumentative quality of the contestants' presentations and it does not
provide an opinion. The Jessup court does not rely upon facts or materials
introduced from outside the problem, nor does it review the memorials,
which are reviewed by others. The second approach thus serves one of the
major objectives, to wit, an appraisal of the forensic capabilities of the
contestants and the selection of those that are superior in a given contest.
Of course, both approaches serve the learning objective mentioned earlier.
But if pursued, the venture into advisory competence offers the
Jessup an opportunity to undertake a further task of probing.26 The ICJ,
26. Pursuit of a theory of advisory opinions might also benefit by assessments or inquiry
into what is expected from a court that is providing such opinions. See, e.g., ABRAHAM
KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY (Chandler Pub. Co. 1964). According to Kaplan, we are
not compelled in social order inquiries, including inquiries into law and its jurisprudence, to meet
the standards of a pure and exact science, or those expected in the physical sciences. He points
out that "science itself manages quite well even though its own most basic principles are
something less than necessarily and unconditionally true." Id. at 13. If the preparatory work for
an advisory opinion in the ICJ or the Jessup Court requires new methods or techniques, there is
ample development of methodology to draw upon:
[m]ethods are techniques sufficiently general to be common to all sciences, or to a
significant part of them. Alternatively, they are logical or philosophical principles
sufficiently specific to relate especially to science as distinguished from other human
enterprises and interests. Thus, methods include such procedures as forming concepts
and hypotheses, making observations and measurements, performing experiments,
building models and theories, providing explanations, and making predictions.
Id. at 23.
Kaplan later observes:
[a] scientific concept has meaning only because scientists mean something by it. The
meaning is scientifically valid only if what they intend by it becomes actual: problems
are solved and intentions are fulfilled as inquiry continues. Since Kant, we have come
to recognize every concept as a rule of judging or acting, a prescription for organizing
the materials of experience so as to be able to go about our business. Everything
depends, of course, on what our business is.
Id. at 46.
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the object of such probing, is an institution that is gradually gaining
strength with regard to customary international law and the promotion of
treaty law. The global community stands to benefit from such efforts at
promoting a court that began its life in a weakened position. A
determination, even on the moot court-gaming dimension, may assist us in
finding what we can expect from the ICJ, and under what conditions these
expectations might become operative. Hence the venture can probe the
possibilities through moot court exercises of strengthening the competence
of the ICJ itself. The specific possibilities of this nature and even a
preliminary inquiry into the appropriate theory of advisory opinion
jurisdiction, either for the ICJ or the Jessup Court, are not explored here.
But such an inquiry might include in our objectives an expansion of the ICJ
and its panels to reach regional disputes, and a more sophisticated
competence for the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 21
"Recognition is the source of all our natural knowledge," Whitehead has said. "The whole
scientific theory is nothing else than an attempt to systematize our knowledge of the
circumstances in which such recognitions will occur." It is the enterprise of making those
identifications in experience which prove to be most significant for the control or appreciation of
the experience yet to come. Id. at 85.
Laws are not generalizations at which we arrive we have established the facts; they
play a part in the process of determining what the facts are. Indeed, we may without a
vicious circularity accept some datum as a fact because it conforms to the very law for
which it counts as another confirming instance, and reject an allegation of fact because
it is already excluded by law.
Id. at 89.
27. KAPLAN, supra note 26, at 89. Also see the discussion made in this paper infra. Whether
or not theory formation is the most important and distinctive scientific activity, in one sense of
the term theory this activity might well be regarded as the most important and distinctive for
human beings. In this sense it stands for the symbolic dimension of experience, as opposed to
the apprehension of brute fact. The content of our experience is not a succession of mere
happenings, but a sequence of more or less meaningful events, meaningful both in themselves
and in the patterns of their occurrence. They are consequential, that is - significant in their
bearings on one another. Id. at 294.
A theory is a way of making sense of a disturbing situation so as to allow us most
effectively to bring to bear our repertoire of habits, and even more important, to modify habits or
discard them altogether, replacing them by new ones as the situation demands. In the
reconstructed logic, accordingly, theory will appear as the device for interpreting, criticizing,
and unifying established laws, modifying them to fit data unanticipated in their formulation, and
guiding the enterprise of discovering new and more powerful generalizations. To engage in
theorizing means not just to learn by experience but to take thought about what is there to be
learned. To speak loosely, lower animals grasp scientific laws, but never rise to the level of
scientific theory. Id. at 295.
Theory puts things known into a system. But this function is more than a matter of what the
older positivism used to call economy of thought or moral shorthand, and what today is expressed
in terms of the storage and retrieval of information. It is true that the systematization effected by
a theory does not have the consequence of simplifying laws and introducing order into congeries
of fact. But this is a by-product of a more basic function: to make sense of what would
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Lastly, we can invoke the Jessup moot court framework for testing
and also teaching the use of models or theories to promote the assimilation
of common standards of policy and law.2 In short, it offers a setting
amounting to a meta-world setting: it offers us a chance to look at how we
and others look at real world happenings, and with sophistication of
technique, how we from differing cultures go about solving and working
the problems. Although the Jessup invokes law, it is not the means for
generating law. It might of course generate law for the problem, but this
is not the law we might anticipate will be applicable in the real world.
And it is evident that the Jessup does not provide us with precedents of law
either for future Jessups, or otherwise. But participating in the Jessup
assists in the promotion of scientific thought, and assists in shaping
effective mind sets of those involved in clarifying complex problems of
policy and strategy.
But, this is not the place for working out a theory of theories" or
for constructing a program that might help us break up and analyze policy
and legal problems as such. 0 Unquestionably our goals will call for
otherwise be inscrutable or unmeaning empirical findings. A theory is more than a synopsis of
the moves that have been played in the game of nature; it also sets forth some idea of the rules of
the game, by which the moves become intelligible. Id. at 302.
It might well be said that the predicament of behavioral science is not the absence of theory
but its proliferation. The history of science is undeniably a history of the successive replacement
of poor theories by better ones, but advances depend on the way in which each takes account of
the achievement of its predecessors. Much of the theorizing in behavioral science is not building
on what has already been established so much as laying out new foundations, or even worse,
producing only another set of blueprints. Id. at 304.
28. See discussion generally in the notes from Kaplan's study.
29. See POWER, supra note 12; KAPLAN, supra note 26. See brief introductory note in
the discussion of this paper. The commentators generally perceive strategy as a theory of
control, and military strategy therefore becomes a control over the weapons, methods of use, and
the war fighting activities.
30. For the interaction of concepts in theory and strategy, see J.C.WYLIE, MILITARY
STRATEGY: A GENERAL THEORY OF POWER CONTROL (Greenwood Press 1980). Although
discussed later in this paper, that discussion can usefully be anticipated here. Wylie uses the
term power as a term of value, following the usage adopted by Lasswell, McDougal and their
associates. See STUDIES, supra note 1. He observes that "while strategy itself may not be a
science, strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective,
inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive." Wylie's definition thus contains two elements.
Strategy, he says, can best be defined as "a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end;
a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment." WYLIE supra at 13.
Wylie argues that his definition has two elements: the definition is not limited to war or even
military applications. And the definition involves the balancing of relevant factors that comprise
the definition. Hence the purpose and system of measures to achieve the purpose are included in
the single concept. His framework thus would assist us in using the Jessup moot or the
wargaming concepts and contexts or all of these. Wylie observes: "It should be recognized at
1998] Almond 649
achieving such a program or even a theory of control eventually." But the
purpose here is to introduce the gaming concept in the framework of the
moot case, and analyzing that framework to determine its potential in
shaping or at least testing attitudes. The Jessup offers us the opportunities
for exposing the attitudes of the participants in the context of a Jessup
context - the predispositions, biases, assumptions, inferences, and the
skeptical features in their decision making efforts. Our purpose, which is
scientific in nature, is to work toward finding the way to common
objectives and standards and a common vocabulary among the contestants
and others; toward installing trend thinking; and toward scientific
skepticism. These attitudes are likely to be most fruitful in pursuing a
scientific inquiry and the scientific and progressive development of the
decision-making art.32
the outset of this discussion that a strategy has no moral quality of its own. It is inherently
neither good nor evil; it is always normative or concerned with values." Id. at 15.
Wylie referring to principles of war observes a qualification to the effect that the wise
commander must know when and how to apply the principles and also when and how to violate
them. I think that what the principles really are is an attempt to rationalize and categorize
common sense. I suggest that worship of any such patter as the principles of war is an unaware
substitution of slogan for thought, probably brought about the by intellectual formlessness that
must inevitably exist when there is no orderly and disciplined pattern of fundamental theory from
which one consciously or unconsciously takes departure. Id. at 20. Wylie points out that he has
never come across the use of principles as the means to achieve a strategy.
31. See WYLIE, supra note 30, at 10 (discussing strategy a quest for control).
The basic patterns of strategic thought should not be looked on as any kind of a secret. The
more people who know about and understand these patterns, the more healthy will- be our
democracy in its strategic decisions. The Congressman voting on a military appropriation is, in a
very real sense indeed, making a fundamental strategic decision, and he does not need very many
secrets to lead him toward a sound decision.
The same could be said of the citizen's participation and enlightenment about the emergence
of a global law affording him as a major outcome the enhancement of his nation's - and his -
security. Hence Wylie, while speaking of military strategy, has reached the conclusion that the
McDougal-Lasswell approach provides the appropriate theory:
I have been talking about one form or another of military control. But I do hope that it
has come out clearly that military control, or military affairs in the broad sense, can
seldom be taken up in isolation. Military matters are inextricably woven into the
whole social power fabric. And this is why a general theory of strategy must, I
believe, be a theory of power in all its form, not just a theory of military power.
Id. at 110
32. See id., for a discussion of the interrelationship of theory and strategy for military
purposes: Wylie is on a continuous quest for control in the decision process that will enable his
strategy to serve military activities in a collegiate sense. In law the general approach is toward
the promotion of public order - global public order anong states. But as McDougal and his
associates have pointed out, we realistically seek immediate attainable goals, and carry this out in
the larger context of a comprehensive program for more remote goals. See STUDIES, supra note
1. The observations of Hausrath are enlightening:
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B. The Benefits of Gaming
So, to what extent can the experience of gaming benefit the
strengthening of the Jessup Moot Court as an instrument both for learning
and for promoting policy? Some experts to be sure have insisted that the
potential for prediction through war games or through moot competitions
are matters that are generally speculative. Allen, citing other authors,
points out:
I believe that models can be used for military gaming. But
political-military gaming? You can't predict. You can't
even predict what's likely to happen. You may get some
insights, but unless you have enough data that can be
quantified and enough data that will give you what I call
actuarial comparisons, you can't be sure of what is typical
and what is atypical. The model is useful only if it can
represent a typical situation.33
Despite these comments, combinations of gaming and the
adversary test of the moot court regime might be considered through a
joint effort among theorists for both approaches. The objective of
combining the two is to look into validation of a theory not possible by
pursuing one approach alone. The adversary environment of the Jessup
problems offers us an opportunity of testing the receptivity of claims by an
independent, objective tribunal. The data and intelligence flowing to the
war gaming center, appraised after the introduction of the military and
[flormal games attempt to investigate a particular group of questions or problems,
obtain an adequate amount of data from the game, and organize all into meaningful
comparisons or summaries. It is rare that the gross result of the game - as, for
example, Who won? - is a prime consideration. In this respect a war game is unlike a
sports contest. In a sense, all war gaming is undertaken for learning purposes, in
preparation for leadership and employment of military forces in real war. Therefore,
the emphasis is placed on finding ways to improve, or to use, resources for maximum
combat effectiveness.
So likewise the use of a gaming approach coupled with the moot court might serve us
in the future for the same purposes, but perhaps more for the purposes of extending
our use of the International Court of Justice, and the options available for expanding a
reasonable claim of jurisdiction. Hausrath pursues his inquiry into the use of war
gaming to reduce the costs as well as to refine the methods of warfare.
Idat 91.
33. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 64. Writers such as Klaus Knoor and Oscar Morgenstern
have denied the scientific possibility of prediction. McDougal and his associates propose the use




other related instruments in the gaming context, can become an appraisal
of testing data by claims, and of compelling the adversary system to
produce its results by imposing the claims process on a changing
environment. In effect, the judges for the gaming action are not the judges
of the gaming process, but the judges and the process of adversarial claims
of the moot court. Adjustments to make this system operative, and to
introduce law as an element in decision will be required. The procedures
and process for working in the gaming setting as the setting that is the
precondition for the adversary setting of the moot court must also be
designed. But in doing this we must recognize that data banks are not
infallible. If there is no funding to keep them complete and current, or if
the personnel for producing and maintaining the data banks are untrained
or incompetent, they will fail us when we need them.
The experience so far with war gaming suggests that gaming
techniques might be coupled with the moot court in order to strengthen the
moot court as a probing or testing mechanism. When the Jessup
competition is considered in the gaming context; that is, when we perceive
a widened number of participants and situations involving legal disputes in
which a larger number of participants are involved, we can exploit
opportunities for testing or probing perspectives of the larger number of
participants much as we encounter these in real world conditions.
Although gaming differs whenever we shift the context of the games, or
whenever the policy content and context are varied, the gaming approach
can be refined by considering the experience of gaming in general,
especially war gaming.14 Allen describes the sophistication reached so far
in war gaming:
34. Wargaming might be expanded and in view of their similarities, the Jessup Moot
Competition might also be expanded where the objective is to get results not presently achieved
by the real world courts. War gaming for example might include the peacetime problems of
force planning. See ROBERT P. HAFFA, PLANNING U.S. FORCES, (Nat. Def. Univ. Press 1988).
He observes in a passage that suggests the similarities between the approaches to problems
concerning the use of weapons and military attack [wargaming in the pure sense] and the
preparation of military capabilities under force planning. There are further similarities in gaming
military exercises, and so on. Haffa states:
Paul Nitze distinguished between declaratory policy - statements of political objectives
with intended psychological effects - and action or employment policy - concrete
military objectives and plans employing current [military] forces in support of those
objectives. Nitze also saw the requirement to match the two levels closely, lest
declaratory policy appear hollow or employment capability inadequate. But that fit has
never been perfect ....
Force planning is the development of [military] forces flowing from the requirements
of declaratory policy or the shortfalls in employment policy. Force development
planning should, therefore, unite a declared strategy and the means to implement it...
1998]
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I really try to create the atmosphere of a White House; the
confusion, the leaks, [and] the turf problems. When I put
a game together I'm looking for certain decisions to be
made and I want to confront them with certain problems.
And then I want to give them out to these human beings
and I want them to get upset. Not too upset. It's not a
highly refined art form. And yet you can kind of predict
where it's all heading because you know what the options
really are.
I think the term art form is correct. I don't think there's a
science in this. It's not inferentially based. Nor are there
controlled conditions under which it's done enough to get
neat statistical evidence.
The search for that neat statistical evidence has led military
game designers away from human beings and toward the
most rational of all players, the computer."
The most appropriate appraisal can be made by considering the
widely adopted practice among military officers to become involved in war
gaming. The experience gained in gaming about war is useful in itself for
assessing the success of the Jessup Moot Court and similar dispute
* Declaratory policy is the strategy of the elected political leaders. . . . Employment
or action policy, on the other hand, lies in the domain of the military.
Id. at 4.
35. ALLEN, supra note 5, at 281-82. Consider the conclusions concerning the utility and
effectiveness of gaming as established by Allen. War gaming is at the stage where effective use
of the games is achieved by simulated solutions to real problems. Id. at 289. War gaming is
already used to test hypothetical but real world simulations as well as to provide experience and
teaching to those who participate in the game: Simulations are the next best thing to testing
weapons and defenses against real Soviet submarines or tanks. And here the spectrum [of
gaming] gets cloudy. Testing is a fine art that balances the reality of battle against the
abstraction of a would-be weapon. Testing is an art like other arts, for it attracts creators,
clients, patrons - and critics.
War gaming teaches that only the games that have a working framework of rules can be
played and if the problems are raised under the rules they can then be solved:
[w]e learn very early in life that games have rules. The value of a war game is that it
shows the results of a war when it is played as a game, with rules. Ever since the days
of the Battle of Maldon the warriors of Western civilization have tried to wage war by
rules. When nuclear war became the new kind of war, we tried to stick with the old
rules. If Ivan and Sam have taught us anything it is this: The nuclear threshold is the
place where war by the rules ends. Beyond that threshold, no war game can go, for
beyond that threshold there are no rules.
Id. at 350.
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settlement contexts when measured against their objectives, and it is also
useful because gaming is a process in which adversary positions are taken.
An imaginative group of participants may also be able to mine their war
gaming efforts to uncover new or innovative means of dispute settlement.
New process-oriented dispute settlement procedures might benefit us by
reducing the possibility of a failed enterprise, or the likelihood of
producing a controversy that might become more important than the
enterprise once entertained in an adversary setting such as an arbitration or
adjudicatory tribunal.
Gaming, in general, provides the situations and simulation for
working with perspectives and principles in an operational context, where
others are involved, and where differing perspectives are in contest. It
provides an operational setting for the vocabulary, concepts and symbols
that must be used for communications among opposing groups and within
the groups as well. But unlike war gaming, the gaming of legal disputes
through refinement of the Jessup would draw more deeply upon the
interaction of decisions and claims that reach into principles and theory;
the application of principles and theory; and the theory of application.
We can anticipate and draw upon fruitful experience from the war
gaming context, and work with conceptual elements that have their
counterpart in the struggles of advocates. In time, if adopted, the gaming
of the moot court situations will reinforce and strengthen the war gaming
process also.
War gaming is undertaken by military and political policy-makers
to investigate the processes of combat. The objective is not the real world
of combat in an effort to assist in calculating the outcomes of those
processes, but to provide a setting in which decisions are made, abstracted
from the real world, yet linked to it because the experience in gaming
decisions in itself is useful. But caution is needed. One writer on war
gaming, familiar with the use of such games at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island observes:
The power of a wargame to communicate and convince,
however, can also be a potential source of danger.
Wargames can be very effective at building a consensus on
the importance of key ideas or factors in the minds of
36. According to PETER PERLA, THE ART OF WARGAMING (Naval Institute Press 257
1990), playing non-U.S. or threat roles in a professional wargame is not really much different
from playing friendly or Blue roles. Playing the threat well, however, requires special effort,
and often special training or expertise. Red players must understand not only the technical
capabilities of the opposition, but their tactical and strategic doctrine as well. To play Red, the
player must learn to think Red.
1998] 653
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
participants. They attempt to create the illusion of reality,
and good games succeed. This illusion can be a powerful
and sometimes insidious influence, especially on those who
have limited operational experience. For example a poorly
designed game could allow players access to an unrealistic
quantity and quality of information and so give those
players a false picture of the worth of a weapon system
that relies on just such unattainable information to be
effective.
In wargames, as in any approach to study and analysis,
there is always a possibility that intentional or unintentional
advocacy of particular ideas or programs may falsely color
the events and decisions made in a game and lead to self-
fulfilling prophecies. The designer of a game has great
power to inform or to manipulate.31
Nevertheless, the experience of those involved in war games and
the practice that they afford can be probed for looking into the use of the
Jessup competition as a multi-faceted instrument. As such it can serve to
examine in depth the current problems of international law. It can serve to
provide innovative ideas for promoting that law. And it will serve in
honing the minds and thinking of the contestants and observers with regard
to that law. The final rounds of the Jessup, even in its present form,
without the added refinements that may be available in the war gaming
experience, deserves to be televised for broader public consideration.
To determine the concepts of gaming and their application to the
Jessup competition, we might look more closely at the experience achieved
in war gaming. The purpose of these games has been to acquaint those
who play with the past experience of others in military combat. The
predictability powers of war games in the past has been spotty, but the
utility of war games, as the only device that has been sufficiently refined to
approximately fit real world activities played out in real time, has been
recognized.18 And if it does not serve explanation, war gaming, in any
event, serves other purposes which will be discussed here.
37. Id. at 182.
38. Predictability through models may be something that cannot be expected scientifically
even when the models are used for the physical sciences. As part of an analysis in greater depth,
Abraham Kaplan, appraising explanation and prediction, points out:
In whichever way explanation is reconstructed [i.e., as a deductive model or pattern
model], prediction is at least a possibility. In both models, laws serve to explain
events and theories to explain laws; a good law allows us to predict new facts and a
good theory new laws. At any rate, the success of the prediction in either case adds
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According to one expert, the war game has many of the features
that were first caught up by Clausewitz, observing that warfare is the great
decision arena of the unpredictable, described in his metaphor of "the
friction of war."3 ' James F. Dunnigan, a consultant to the Department of
Defense on wargames, first notes that there are various ways to play the
wargame. However,
Basically, you obtain good games by paying attention to
past experience (history) and letting the chips fall where
they may. Combat is a dispassionate arbiter of what works
and what doesn't. If your games reflect political rather
than combat reality, you're likely to find yourself fatally
ill-prepared on the battlefield. . . However, current
peacetime illusions will always carry more weight than
future wartime reality. Unless someone is shooting at you,
immediate political demands take precedence over potential
military ones. This can change if you actually develop
realistic wargames, use them diligently, and widely
distribute the results.40
As mentioned earlier, wars are arenas replete with uncertainty -
with the murkiness of weather symbolizing the murkiness of the military
campaign. Hence, according to Dunnigan,
Nothing new here except that historically there has always
been a steady drift from reality in the peacetime military.
Warfare is a complex process that cannot be easily
credibility to the beliefs which led to it, and a corresponding force to the explanations
which they provide.
KAPLAN, supra note 26, at 346.
39. According to Clausewitz:
[e]verything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has
experienced war. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the
factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. This tremendous friction, which
cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with
chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely
due to chance. One, for example, is the weather. Fog can prevent the enemy from
being seen in time, a gun from firing when it should, a report from reaching the
commanding officer. Rain can prevent a battalion from arriving, make another late by
keeping it not three but eight hours on the march, ruin a cavalry charge by bogging the
horses down in mud, etc.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119, 120 (Howard and Paret, ed. And trans. Princeton Univ.
Press, 1976).
40. PERLA, supra note 36, at xviii.
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understood when you can't actually do it. So it's
understandable that peacetime preparations, including
gaming, will 'drift' away from the unknown wartime
reality. Contributing to this drift are new weapons and
equipment, new tactics and doctrine, and new political
situations. Social changes also have an impact: things like
economic growth or decline, different partisan political
differences, and the replacement of conscription with
volunteers. These changes are complicated by changes
within potential enemy nations. All of this is further
clouded by secrecy. 1
Dunnigan's observations conclude with the general usefulness of
the wargame. In his view, the games provide a setting for exercising
thinking, perception, and decision making skills that no other device could
afford. Though warfare is fraught with uncertainty, he noted that the
usefulness of war games is in what it can accomplish in the decision-
process, experienced in practice with others. The quest is toward the
assimilation of the realistic patterns of behavior and conduct, and the
cautious assimilation of what the games can offer. "Before the Japanese
defeat off Midway Island in 1942, Japanese admirals dismissed wargames
that showed they could lose their carriers using their current plans. The
Japanese admirals went ahead, and lost four carriers and naval superiority
in the Pacific. You trifle with wargame validity at your own risk."' 2
We could add to the above the fact that war games extend back to
antiquity. Though the games of antiquity take different forms, as in the
Odyssey of Homer, and in those forms lack some of the precision,
predictability, or explanatory power of the present games, they afforded
much in common. Decisions and policies are made by human beings in
contexts that can be reasonably replicated, and the experience of making
those decisions, in itself, is a significant skill-oriented and skill-shaping
effort.
War games are thus mentioned here primarily to consider the
conceptual elements that may be common to games in general. These
41. Id. at xix.
42. Id. at xx. It should be borne in mind that the Japanese Chiefs of Staff did use war
games, but their assumptions and inferences, and their perceptions of the realities of the war,
were affected by outcomes that they insisted upon achieving. They had achieved great success in
using their intelligence sources to locate the United States naval fleet at Pearl Harbor, the
priorities to be attained as to military targets, etc. But they failed to consider the possible




common elements may be used to consider the Jessup competition, or the
moot court, used by lawyers, and to determine how the moot cases such as
the Jessup might be strengthened; thereby, strengthening the skills and the
exercise of perceptions over situations by jurists. The jurists' art when
faced with the legal order and decisions under law among nation-states,
perhaps more than that of the military commander, may be able to benefit
from war games concepts, adapted to the decisions of law even more than
the military commander under his war games, because so much of the legal
issues among states are issues that can only be approached or analyzed
through the symbolism of policy, or through high degrees of abstraction,
or by way of the generalities, and vague expressions and vocabulary of
principles that must be brought to bear for resolution among choices.
The nature of war games indicates much that can be shared in
common with the Jessup and other moot court games. To gain a better
base for the purposes of comparison, consider the war game and how it
operates at present. The war game, we have been told, is not analysis or
intended to provide analysis of real world situations.' It is not the means
for making comparisons among alternative solutions. Second, the game is
not part of the realities of state behavior; it is abstracted with changes
necessary for games and the compressed time span for decisions. Third,
the games are not things that can be duplicated.
The results, the nature of the play, the decisions and policies made
or adopted, the reactions and tactics will differ, the strategies, if similar,
will have been so broadly posited that they could encompass a variety of
tactics and possibilities, with a variety of chances for success or failure.
Though the non-duplication element reflects reality, the approaches taken
are unique, as they are in the real world. The game, as Thomas Schelling
has indicated, operates in the context of decisions and the decision process,
and the strategies and tactics are shaped in the interaction process, that is,
by the interaction of decisions.
In the war context, actions or decisions made by one side - new
weapons, new tactics or methods of attack, new uses of weapons, and so
on - lead to responses on the other side, not necessarily predictable.
Wars occur in conditions of such uncertainty as to lead to chaos as to the
choices and the conditioning factors that might determine the choices to be
made by the decision maker, both in the real world and in the game. Wars
are charged with variables and involve chaotic situations that affect
military choices or affect decisions and action, but this element of chaos
simply becomes a challenge for those involved to find innovative ways to
accommodate change. And its presence is such that it becomes a factor in
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the war game, or any other game of policy and decision, reflecting that
change and chance may affect the results.43
War games, we are told, have objectives, whose clarity determine
the effectiveness or success of the game. The overall context of the war
game should be considered briefly in order to determine whether
refinements to the moot court approach are possible, and whether, in
particular, we can adapt the approach to enable the Jessup and similar
moot court problems to provide a useful base for courts or other decision-
makers that might be concerned with a similar problem.
The war game is designed to place the participants in specific
situations - a context in which they make their decisions. The gaming
procedure involves a data base or the information needed by the
participants with regard to their making decisions. And it includes models
or tables that translate the data of the game into the events that are taking
place: these may be tables and mathematical expressions offering an
opportunity to reflect chance in the operation. Rules and procedures set
forth the means for applying the models. Finally, the game will have game
analysis as one of its essential elements but the use of analysis will vary
according to the purpose of conducting the wargame:
In a training game, analysis will usually consist of an
instructor's observation and critique of the student's play.
In a research game, analysis focuses on understanding why
decisions were made. A good analysis plan, outlining
where observers should be placed and what they should be
looking for, is essential, but the process of game analysis
not simply one of mechanics or even observation. The
data collected during game play are only the raw material
for the synthesis of insights and identification of issues."
Perla summarizes the usefulness of war gaming in terms of the
element of process: the role of the game is "to help human beings
43. Perla argues that among the objectives or services afforded through wargaming are
those that enable the participants to process information, to consider differing inputs and their
impacts on expected outcomes, to investigate processes involved such as those of the interaction
of belligerents to provide opportunities for learning, including the means to motivate or
encourage further learning, to supplement other measures for assessing future policy, and so on.
Wargames he warns are not to be confused with systems or operations analysis wargame analysis
must be based "on a careful and comprehensive observation of the gamining process."
Wargaming, he believes, resembles most closely exploratory science or historical research. Id.
at 1-12.
44. Id. at 167.
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investigate the processes of combat, not to assist them in calculating the
outcomes of those processes."4 -
Perla refers to the design as an art, pointing out that experience
alone of military officers, or others familiar with the workings of games,
will suffice. War gaming, he points out, is a form of communication and
resembles the construction of a historical novel. Gaming design requires
"the construction of a framework, the creative building of an internally
complete and consistent world whose broad contours are contained within
the bounds of its historical context. ""
The game, in play, arouses participants of the game itself, and, the
wargame calls for the sponsor of the game, the source of the messages put
to the players, to be involved in a communications flow actualized amongst
players and sponsor. Communications entail the transmittal of questions,
interpretations, inquiries for clarification, and even insights amongst these
two groups. 7
Design extends through the stages of concept development,
research, drafting of rules, and so on. The primary guidelines are: first,
those of an attempt to simulate accurately the historical events intended to
be the subject matter of the game; and second, the simulation materials
must be commensurate with that guideline. In a sense, these are the
requirements aimed at a degree of realism and playability, making the
game operative.
Other features in designing the game can be by-passed at this
point, or briefly mentioned. The sponsor seeks to learn about certain
outcomes through communications with the players: the sponsor thus has a
stake in the game though it may differ from that of the players. Perhaps
further analysis will show the nature of the stake of the judges of the
Jessup in learning about outcomes, as well as the stake of the advocates or
agents who argue the cases and seek to hone through their instruments of
persuasion. Various questions can be raised as to these features. But these
features resemble in many ways the framework of inquiry developed by
Lasswell and McDougal, and their associates." Objectives, participants,
strategies, conditioning factors, all enter into the design inquiry and make
the ultimate game more likely a successful exercise. The data should be
45. Id. at 179.
46. PERLA, supra note 36, at 183.
47. The discussion here draws heavily on the study by Perla, Chapter 5, "Designing
Wargames." That chapter, and the book itself, would need to be examined in greater detail,
along with other texts to provide a complete comparison and review of the wargaming and the
gaming in the Jessup competitions. Id. at 183ff.
48. See generally POWER, supra note 12.
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commensurate with the game - the data made available in the problem;
the data acquired during the moot trials; and the data molded and even
synthesized by the interdependency of a successful give and take of
argument in the trial itself.
9
Perla suggests some fundamental principles applicable, at least, in
the wargaming context:
1) Adapt the rules to the game, and not the game to
the rules.
2) Tell the players everything they need to know to
play the game by structuring the rules around the sequence
of play.
3) Provide plenty of examples to illustrate how the
rules are supposed to work, both individually and in
concert.
4) Explain the underlying rationale for particularly
important or especially unusual rules.
49. Perla refers to the use of "scenarios" or what might be called the situation in which the
game takes place. He argues that the scenarios must be designed to permit decision making
flexibility, minimizing restrictions on those decisions, and permitting as much freedom of choice
as is possible. PERLA, supra note 36, at 203, 204. Simply stated, a scenario should include all
essential information about the game's setting and subsequent planned modifications to it, and
should contain no superfluous information. Id. at 205.
The designer is in a unique position because he creates the environment for the play of the
game:
Good scenario-design practice involves four fundamental principles: understanding the
problem, building from the bottom up, documenting choices, and communicating results. d. at
207.
The expression "building from the bottom up" refers to a design that defines the decision
points, provides for a hierachy of information and assumption, flowing through those who are
made part of the problem, simulating their real world activities, and ensuring completeness,
coherence, and credibility of the problem. Id. at 211, and see previous pages for discussion.
Perhaps differing from the moot court situations a large data base is made available, and
then drawn upon by the players or contestants in the war game. The data base is constant, but
the base itself is a source to be tapped, and not provided as the data afforded all parties as in the
Jessup. If the Jessup had this data base, it would have a data source available to the Jessup
judges, and common to all of the proceedings, but it would be a matter for the contestants to
request and draw upon or be refused the data they request.
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5) Integrate the text explaining the rules with the
graphical play aids designed to help implement them. '°
Clearly, the format and the practice of play in war games is not
identical with that of the Jessup Competition. However, there are features
and experience, shown in this brief discussion that can be used to refine the
Jessup, or to provide us with standards to test and assure the effectiveness
of the Jessup. It might be possible in the Jessup, though not in the
wargaming enterprise, to consider the problems considered by the
international court in exercising its advisory jurisdiction. Hence, the
gaming plan and situations may be adapted so that the contestants and the
games can be adapted to the context of an inquiry into legal questions as
distinguished from legal disputes.
Other features make distinguishing contrasts between the objectives
of war gaming and moot court gaming; the differences in situations or
scenarios alone are sufficient to lead to these distinctions. Perla argued
that the war games results are validated best by the degree to which they
reflect reality "as opposed to the artificiality of the gaming environment."1
War games include a report of the game by third parties - a procedure not
adopted in the Jessup, though it might be considered - and analysis by
third parties as well. But even in the context of the military campaign or
combat, the analysis will not apply according to mathematical strictures:
While analysis focuses on systems, the true value of
wargaming lies in its unique ability to illuminate the effect
of the human factor in warfare. By their very nature,
wargames seek to explore precisely those messy,
'unquantifiable' questions that analysis must ignore.
Wargames teach us what we didn't know we didn't know.
To accomplish that, however, wargames must give up any
vain hope of achieving the detailed mathematical structure
and rigorous calculation characteristic of analysis. A
wargame is not and will not ever be a mathematical
experiment whose initial conditions can be recreated
precisely and varied at will. The fundamental initial
conditions of a game - the knowledge, talent, character,
50. Id. at 227.
51. Id. at236.
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and experience of the players - changes as players change
or as they play the game more.12
With growing use and familiarity of the wargaming techniques
consciously applied to the gaming elements of the Jessup competition we
might expect that we shall have new insights into the gaming process itself,
so that we can refine that process. To do this we would need to turn to the
possibility of adding to the moot court a program for analyzing the results
of the Jessups, and monitoring and appraising the process itself. This
would be aimed at the process itself, but also the process in a given moot
court case, to provide clarification and better understanding about how it
works and what would make it serve our objectives more effectively.
Though the element of analysis needs further assessment than that
given here, because it would require assessment in context of the moot
court cases, we can turn once more to Perla who catches a part of this
feature in his remarks:
Wargames allow for the continual adjustments of strategies
and tactics by both sides in response to the developing
situation and outcomes of specific engagements; such
adjustments are not seen in campaign analysis. Wargames
afford their players a measure of control over events
through the decisions they make during play. Unlike a
campaign analysis in which changes in strategy occur as a
result of calculating the outcomes of implementing the
strategy, wargame decisions are not based on a clear and
complete understanding of all the facts (much less the
results) but rather on how the players view the facts
through a cloudy and possibly incomplete frame of
reference that is often distorted by preconceived notions,
poor information, and the pressure of time - in other
words, the fog of war. In a campaign analysis, a strategy
that leads to disastrous losses is simply discarded; in a
wargame, most decisions cannot be recalled after they have
been made."
52. PERLA, supra note 36, at 284, 285. Perla further distinguishes in such games the
differing perspectives of the military player or military analyst, from the civilian. This derives in
part from differing experience or vocational cultures, and in part because the military officer is
placed in a military decision making rule, while the civilian is put in the role of the analyst. The
civilian is tempted at least to impose rigor, and to that end has invented the operations research,
the systems analysis, and other mathematically oriented analytical tools for that purpose.
53. Id. at 283.
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III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From a policy perspective, this paper is an inquiry into exploring
and reappraising the application of the Jessup competition as a means of
enhancing legal education. But it also provides a preliminary look at other
uses. With regard to legal education, as Professors McDougal and
Lasswell had observed:
A first indispensable step toward the effective reform of legal
education is to clarify the ultimate aim. We submit this basic proposition:
if legal education in the contemporary world is adequately to serve the
needs of a free and productive commonwealth, it must be conscious,
efficient, and systematic training for policy-making. The proper function
of our law schools is, in short, to contribute to the training of policy-
makers for the ever more complete achievement of the democratic values
that constitute the professed ends of American polity. '
The two authors supported the moot court as a key device for professional
training:
One principle of professional training is to project the
student into situations that resemble as closely as possible
the circumstances of his future career. One well-
established pattern of this type can, in the reformed law
school, be turned into a more productive instrument of
legal education. We refer to the moot court. It is common
in some places to conduct various autopsies on the
performance of students before these tribunals. What we
propose is that the appraisal should be conducted not only
in terms of legal technicality but for the purpose of
revealing the total effectiveness of the participant in
handling himself in the situation."
Experience with war gaming indicates that a key refinement
involving policy can be made with the Jessup moot case by increasing the
number of participants and by specifying the appropriate objectives in
designing both the problem and the conduct of the competition. By adding
on participants that critique the Jessup as well as others that might draft a
report on the Jessup's findings, or by including additional competence for
the Jessup format, such as the preparation of advisory opinions, the Jessup
has the possibilities of providing a more substantial contribution to
54. Legal Education, supra note 1, at 46.
55. Id. at 149. Lasswell and McDougal note the potential use of recording measures,
motion pictures, testing facilities, and intensive coaching, applying some of the procedures to be
found in modem clinical psychology.
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international law itself. Finally, the Jessup format can be used by
experienced lawyers or jurists. If they are used, the differing or matured
perspectives of the practitioner or scholar can be added. In all of these
refinements, we bear in mind that the Jessup is a simulation, not a real
world exercise, but, as such, it has the advantages of operating in a
framework that can focus on the law and its impacts.
The Jessup is conceived in this paper as an instrument; that is, it is
an instrument that is aimed at policy or strategic objectives. Seen in that
light, law, especially international law, is a strategic instrument in itself,
coupling in some instances, diplomatic, economic, ideological or even
military strategies. Thus, law beyond the Jessup, extending to
enforcement, includes resort to permissible force, where force is perceived
as an essential means to maintain or protect public order.
Hence the Jessup can be used as an instrument that enables us to
probe either past policy or prospective policy that is involved with the
impacts of law. Second, the Jessup is an instrument that enables the
participants to learn about law, policy and decision-making. The
effectiveness of this depends upon the problem design and upon the
motivation and capabilities of the participants. Problem design thus
requires separate attention so that the design is aimed at specific objectives
- probing law, testing law and its applications, and so on.
Third, the Jessup can be used to review cases that have taken place
in the ICJ, thus affording another vehicle for critiquing those cases. Such
critiques have greater strength than those that are in the form of
commentary, and should produce publishable material for learned and
practicing lawyer journals.
The Jessup necessarily is an instrument to promote international
law. And the law it promotes is then perceived as a strategic instrument
with strategic goals of its own to attain. Moreover, it is then perceived as
part of the larger, collegial, global strategy to establish and strengthen
global public order and its law. Hence it can also serve to probe and assist
the law-making process; to condition or alert the attitudes of the
practitioners; to hone the minds and analytical skills of the jurist involved
in international law; and to arouse the interaction of theory and practice,
and the choices that are available for the pursuit of goals and action.
56. Compare the warning of McDougal and Feliciano:
Inasmuch as an absolute prohibition of coercion has not been feasible, the historical
alternatives of the general community have been either to permit complete disorder or
to aspire to minimum public order. Complete disorder, failure to forbid even the most
intense and comprehensive destruction of values, is not only possible, but has in fact
long characterized the perspectives of traditional international law. If, on the other
hand, the deliberate choice is made to pursue at least a minimum of order in the world
[Vol. 4:635
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Some emphasis should be given to the collegial element that it applies; this
is the element that we find in operation in the law making context. Those
who participate in the Jessup become familiar with what the collegial
aspect is all about. Law is not the output of a single scribe.
Fourth, the Jessup can operate as the simulation of an instrument,
or vehicle, that works with other strategies. It is in a sense a diplomatic
strategy, but as a vehicle, with varying policy content, it can include
diplomatic, economic ideological strategies, or strengthen these. The wide
variety of international institutions attest to the effectiveness of this.
Finally, implicit in the other observations above, the Jessup is an
instrument that can sharpen the critical skills - the skills of the scientific
mind - applied to the complexities of human action. We can anticipate
that those motivated or stimulated by such an activity are likely to continue
with their self-development, but will be stimulated toward an environment
in which law-making actually takes place.
The brief excursus in this paper into strategy, theory, and
wargaming highlights some of the possibilities of pressing the Jessup
format into new uses, into texts for teaching, and into exploratory efforts
that may lead to uncovering further applications. In some respects, the
Jessup will gain in strength and effectiveness once it is perceived that
whatever its shortcomings, the potentials are large, and open-ended. The
need to have greater participation in law-making at all levels of human
activity is widely acknowledged. The Jessup serves this need.57
To this end, the Jessup is a simulation of decision and policy-
making and operates as the means to enable us to refine, correct, and
amplify the jurisdiction of the Court, including the reduction of the impact
of the denial of jurisdiction by the court's invoking the political question,
enabling those involved in the Jessup, like those that were involved in war
gaming, to pursue what the ICJ and other international tribunals are now
arena, the coercion that is to be prohibited clearly must be distinguished from that
which is to be permitted. The conceptions both of impermissible and of permissible
coercion are thus necessary in the theoretical formulation of authoritative policy as
well as in the practical application of that policy to interacting human groups.
MYRES McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD ORDER 128-29
(Yale Univ. Press 1961).
57. There are other instruments to attain this goal. Standardized terms for contracts and
adherence to the policy if not the form of such terms and of contracts relating to trans-national
activities is one of them. A participatory effort for developing and testing such terms might be
conceived to support the aims of the Jessup. See Harry H. Almond, Jr., papers presented at the
meetings of the I.A.F. published in part in Montreal, 1991, Washington 1992, and Graz, 1993,
and Beijing, 1996. Some of these approaches calling for the use of recommendations, joint
adherence to common guidelines, advisory opinions and inquiries, and so on are sometimes
called "soft" law because they are to be distinguished from the work that enters into
undertakings, commitments and the like.
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actively doing. But with the growing appeal of cooperative and joint
enterprise among states, their disputes and disagreements in the future will
tend to disrupt their common enterprise, or even endanger the neighborly
approach to achieving common goals.
Thus, the Jessup, with some of the refinements proposed in this
paper, can first be fashioned into an instrument reaching beyond the
traditional moot court format to serve us in more effective ways, such as
the treatment of issues through alternative dispute settlement procedures.
Perhaps the future combinations might include both gaming and moot court
approaches so that the Jessup Moot Court, no longer rigidly tied to the
traditional confrontational and adversary entity, will be exploited for the
invention and adoption of more appropriate means for shaping our needed,
future law. 8 Or it may be made available for testing the work of the courts
themselves so that the current debate over the law promoting efforts of the
advisory opinion courts can reach more substantial results and even
substantive outcomes. 9  Assessment 'of such alternative settlement
procedures may ultimately lead us to using them in place of the traditional
courts and tribunals, or to supplement the work of those tribunals. 60 A
similar assessment of the application and use of general principles of law
as a means for strengthening the law of the global community may prove to
58. Cf. Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman, International Legal Essays, at 306:
In a community which recognizes knowledge as a crucial scope and base value, an
increasing numer of individuals will tend to perceive themselves as participants in the shaping
and sharing of intelligence.
As the pattern of science-based technology moves toward universality, traditional careers
are abandoned for careers generated by the new knowledge. [Citation omitted]
The two authors in further clarification suggest that competent and experienced policy
scientists may mediate between groups of physical scientists, for example, who have competing
claims to authority.
59. The use of the traditional adversary process of litigation is likely to require alternatives
to avoid the confrontational element of the tribunal. States assessing confrontation as an option
are quick to discern that other means of confrontation may be more desirable in attaining their
goals. The rise of the new institutions - fact-finding in the context of the law of war, the
standing consultative commission of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to recommend the various
paths to agreement, the institutions of numerous agencies and their authority to reach deeply into
promoting the process of negotiation, concession and bargaining - are all familiar techniques that
may replace adjudicatory and arbitrational procedures in the future. Numerous studies are
available on the advisory opinion, its potential for shaping future "legislation," the overlap of
problems concerning the concept of forum non conveniens, and so on.
60. Alternative dispute settlement procedures mentioned earlier in this paper may include
those that take place in an adversary setting, or those in a cooperative or friendly setting. The
latter may be designed to provide for greater party participation through the negotiation and
guided negotiation stage, and less of party confrontation in tribunals and adversary settings. Also
it is possible to design the procedures to afford greater participation in general in resolving
disputes while the enterprise is on-going so that the delays and other problems will not be raised,
or the obstacles of resentment will not occur.
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be as valuable.6' The call of these demands is therefore a call for
imaginative and innovative collegiate efforts that will best serve a global
community of growing interdependence. 2 For these purposes we can look
for analogies, simulations, and models in the municipal legal system,
particularly as it has grown to serve a more complex community, and a
greater, more incessant, interaction of activities. 6
61. The application and standing of general principles of law as law to be applied by the
International Court of Justice pursuant to its Statute's Article 38 has not been fully or
comprehensively explored either by the Court or by commentators. See STUDIES, supra note 1,
at 987-1019, for an important study of principles crucial to the framework of inquiry into the
decision process. The authors describe this framework - and then later the favored principles - as
follows:
I will rather simply recommend the continuous employment, in all our specialized roles, of
a certain process of thought - a frame of reference, a method of inquiry, a disciplined and
contextual mode of analysis - intended to promote the most effective use of our minds in bringing
to bear upon inquiry and specific choice the most relevant findings and techniques of
contemporary science and knowledge ....
Though my principal emphasis will be upon the importance of maintaining a flexible,
policy-oriented, contextual approach to all problems, in an effort to attain the most direct and
immediate contact with contemporary reality, I will develop in some detail certain suggested
alternatives of policy which express my appraisal of the relevant goals, conditions, trends, and
probable future developments. Id. at 990, 991.
The six primary principles are not principles of law in the traditional sense but are
organizing principles enabling the shift toward strengthening public order to meet desired
standards and outcomes, and to be facilitated by the adoption of common concepts. Id. at 999-
1010.
62. A part of these efforts may require the adoption of interviews of past contestants and
past participants in general to establish the Jessup moot courts and their refinements in the future.
It might also benefit from those who have had experience in legal disputes brought before the
International Court of Justice. The overall purpose of such efforts should be kept in view: the
Jessup need not be a simulation of the practice before the ICJ, and, in operation, it is not such a
simulation, but only an approximation. This leaves the way open to refining the competition and
its rules to make it serve more emphatically the learning and probing processes.
63. The essays in the collection An Introduction to Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. (1962) might
serve this purpose in part. The articles taken from various issues of the Review include Felix
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924) (looking into the
legislative implications of the advisory opinion and distinguishing the opinion from those that
involve directly the case or controversy in the jurisdictional principle for subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts); see also JAMES B. THAYER, ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 435 (1893) (considering the formal constitutive
or constitution building processes in American practice). Thayer's article also contains a study
with regard to advisory opinions. Id. at 459. For differing approaches, but showing the
flexibility and innovative quality of American law, see Robert H. Jackson, A President's Legal
Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (June 1953). President Franklin Roosevelt's own opinion as
to the Lend-Lease Bill that by-passed the Congress and perhaps the Constitution as well to
establish a binding obligation with Britain during the second World War. Id. Other approaches
are suggested in Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV.
LAW. REV. 193 (1952); the Brandeis dissent in Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926);
and, BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
